The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1990/90_813/90_813.o

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Subject: 90-813 & 90-974 -- OPINION, HOUSTON LAWYERS' ASSN. v. TEXAS ATTORNEY GEN.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES


Nos. 90-813 and 90-974


HOUSTON LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION, et al.,
PETITIONERS
v.
90-813
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, et al.


LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, et al., PETITIONERS v. 90-974
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS, et al.


on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth
circuit

[June 20, 1991]



    Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.

    In Chisom v. Roemer, ante, at ---, we held that judicial elections,
and, more specifically, elections of justices of the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, are covered by MDRV 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat.
437, as amended in 1982, 42 U. S. C. MDRV 1973.  In this case we consider
whether the statute also applies to the election of trial judges in Texas.
We hold that it does.
I
    Petitioners in No. 90-974 are local chapters of the League of United
Latin American Citizens, a statewide organization composed of both
Mexican-American and African-American residents of the State of Texas, and
various individuals.  They brought this action against the Attorney General
of Texas and other officials (respondents) to challenge the existing
at-large, countywide method of electing state district judges.  Although
the original challenge encompassed the entire State, and relied on both
constitutional and statutory grounds, the issues were later narrowed to
include only a statutory challenge to the voting methods in just 10
counties. {1}  Petitioners in No. 90-813 are the Houston Lawyers'
Association, an organization of African-American attorneys who are
registered voters in Harris County, and certain individuals; they are
intervenors, supporting the position of the original plaintiffs.  Because
all of the petitioners have the same interest in the threshold issue of
statutory construction that is now before us, we shall refer to them
collectively as "petitioners."
    Texas district courts are the State's trial courts of general
jurisdiction.  Electoral districts for Texas district judges consist of one
or more entire counties.  Eight of the districts included in this case
include a single county; the other district includes two counties.  The
number of district judges in each district at issue varies from the 59 that
sit in the Harris County district to the 3 that sit in the Midland County
district.  Each judge is elected by the voters in the district in which he
or she sits pursuant to an at-large, district-wide electoral scheme, and
must be a resident of that district.  Although several judicial candidates
in the same district may be running in the same election, each runs for a
separately numbered position.  Thus, for example, if there are 25 vacancies
in the Harris County district in a particular year, there are 25
district-wide races for 25 separately numbered positions.  In the primary
elections, the winner must receive a majority of votes, but in the general
election the candidate with the highest number of votes for a particular
numbered position is elected.
    Petitioners challenged the at-large, district-wide electoral scheme as
diluting the voting strength of African American and Hispanic voters.  They
cited the example of Harris County, which has a population that is 20%
African American but has only 3 of 59 district judges that are African
American.  The petitioners alleged that alternative electoral schemes using
electoral subdistricts or modified at-large structures could remedy the
dilution of minority votes in district judge elections.
    Following a one-week trial, the District Court ruled in favor of
petitioners on their statutory vote dilution claim.  It concluded that
petitioners had sustained their burden of proving that under the totality
of the circumstances "as a result of the challenged at large system [they]
do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes
and to elect candidates of their choice," App. to Pet. for Cert.,
290a-291a; 300a-301a.  Although the District Court made no findings about
the appropriate remedy for the proven violation, it urged the state
legislature to select and approve an alternative district judge election
scheme.  The District Court also announced that it would entertain motions
to enjoin future district judge elections pending the remedy phase of the
litigation, should the legislature fail to adopt an alternative election
scheme.  When the state legislature failed to act, the District Court
granted interim relief (to be used solely for the 1990 election of district
judges in the nine districts) that included the creation of electoral
subdistricts and a prohibition against the use of partisan elections for
district judges.  Respondents appealed.
    A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the
District Court, 902 F. 2d 293 (1990), and petitioners' motion for rehearing
en banc was granted, 902 F. 2d 322 (1990).  The en banc majority held that
the results test in MDRV 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended in
1982, is inapplicable to judicial elections.  See 914 F. 2d 620 (1990).  In
essence, the majority concluded that Congress' reference to the voters'
opportunity to elect "representatives" of their choice evidenced a
deliberate decision to exclude the election of judges from scrutiny under
the newly enacted test.  For reasons stated in our opinion in Chisom, ante,
at ---, we reject that conclusion.
    In a separate opinion, portions of which were joined by five other
judges, Judge Higginbotham expressed his disagreement with the majority's
conclusion that judges are not "representatives" within the meaning of the
Act, but concurred in the judgment of reversal.  His opinion relied on a
distinction between state appellate judges and trial judges.  Whereas the
justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court have statewide jurisdiction, even
though they are elected by voters in separate districts, and act as members
of a collegial body, the Texas trial judge has jurisdiction that is
coextensive with the geographic area from which he or she is elected and
has the sole authority to render final decisions.  Judge Higgin botham's
opinion characterized trial judges "as single-office holders instead of
members of a multi-member body," 914 F. 2d, at 649 (concurring opinion),
because each exercises his or her authority independently of the other
judges serving in the same area or on the same court.  Given the State's
"compelling interest in linking jurisdiction and elective base for judges
acting alone," id., at 651, and the risk that "attempting to break the
linkage of jurisdiction and elective base . . . may well lessen minority
influence instead of increase it," id., at 649, by making only a few
district court judges principally accountable to the minority electorate
rather than making all of the district's judges partly accountable to
minority voters, he concluded that elections for single-member offices,
including elections for Texas district court judgeships, are exempt from
vote dilution challenges under MDRV 2.
    Chief Judge Clark, while agreeing with the judgment of reversal on
grounds "expressly limited to the facts of the present case," 914 F. 2d 631
(concurring opinion), disagreed with the analysis in both the majority and
the concurring opinion.  He expressed the opinion that "it is equally wrong
to say that section 2 covers all judicial elections as it is to say it
covers none," id., at 633 (emphasis in original).  Charac terizing Judge
Higginbotham's "function-of-the-office analysis" as "identical in concept
to the majority view," ibid., Chief Judge Clark would have held that
whenever an officeholder's jurisdiction and the area of residence of his or
her electorate coincide, no vote dilution claims may be brought against
atlarge schemes for electing the officeholder, regardless of whether the
"function" of the officeholder is to act alone or as a member of a
collegial body.
    In a dissenting opinion, Judge Johnson argued that the Act applies to
all judicial elections:


    "Several truths are self-evident from the clear language of the statute
that had heretofore opened the electoral process to people of all colors.
The Voting Rights Act focuses on the voter, not the elected official.  The
Act was intended to prohibit racial discrimination in all voting, the sole
inquiry being whether the political processes are equally open to all
persons, no matter their race or color.  The Act is concerned only with the
intent of persons of `race or color' in casting a ballot; it has no
interest in the function of the person holding the office."  Id., at 652
(dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original).

II
    We granted certiorari in these cases, 498 U. S. --- (1991), and in
Chisom v. Roemer, ante, p. ---, for the limited purpose of considering the
scope of the coverage of MDRV 2.  As we have held in Chisom, the Act does
not categorically exclude judicial elections from its coverage.  The term
"representatives" is not a word of limitation.  Nor can the protection of
minority voters' unitary right to an equal opportunity "to participate in
the political process and to elect representatives of their choice" be
bifurcated into two kinds of claims in judicial elections, one covered and
the other beyond the reach of the Act.  Ante, at ---.  It is equally clear,
in our opinion, that the coverage of the Act encompasses the election of
executive officers and trial judges whose responsibilities are exercised
independently in an area coextensive with the districts from which they are
elected.  If a State decides to elect its trial judges, as Texas did in
1861, those elections must be conducted in compliance with the Voting
Rights Act.
    We deliberately avoid any evaluation of the merits of the concerns
expressed in Judge Higginbotham's concurring opinion because we believe
they are matters that are relevant either to an analysis of the totality of
the circumstances that must be considered in an application of the results
test embodied in MDRV 2, as amended, or to a consideration of possible
remedies in the event a violation is proved, but not to the threshold
question of the Act's coverage.  Even if we assume, arguendo, that the
State's interest in electing judges on a district-wide basis may preclude a
remedy that involves redrawing boundaries or subdividing districts, or may
even preclude a finding that vote dilution has occurred under the "totality
of the circumstances" in a particular case, that interest does not justify
excluding elections for single-member offices from the coverage of the MDRV
2 results test.  Rather, such a state interest is a factor to be considered
by the court in evaluating whether the evidence in a particular case
supports a finding of a vote dilution violation in an election for a
singlemember office.
    Thus we disagree with respondents that the "single-member office"
theory automatically exempts certain elections from the coverage of MDRV 2.
Rather, we believe that the State's interest in maintaining an electoral
system -- in this case, Texas' interest in maintaining the link between a
district judge's jurisdiction and the area of residency of his or her
voters -- is a legitimate factor to be considered by courts among the
"totality of circumstances" in determining whether a MDRV 2 violation has
occurred.  A State's justification for its electoral system is a proper
factor for the courts to assess in a racial vote dilution inquiry, and the
Fifth Circuit has expressly approved the use of this particular factor in
the balance of considerations.  See Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F. 2d 1297,
1305 (CA5 1973), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall,
424 U. S. 636 (1976).  Because the State's interest in maintaining an
at-large, district-wide electoral scheme for single-member offices is
merely one factor to be considered in evaluating the "totality of
circumstances," that interest does not automatically, and in every case,
outweigh proof of racial vote dilution.
    Two examples will explain why the "single-member office" theory, even
if accepted, cannot suffice to place an election for a single-member
officeholder entirely beyond the coverage of MDRV 2 of the Act.  First, if
a particular practice or procedure, such as closing the polls at noon,
results in an abridgment of a racial minority's opportunity to vote and to
elect representatives of their choice, the Act would unquestionably apply
to restrict such practices, regardless of whether the election was for a
single-member officeholder or not.  Exempting elections for single-member
offices from the reach of MDRV 2 altogether can therefore not be supported.
As we stated earlier, this statute does not separate vote dilution
challenges from other challenges brought under the amended MDRV 2.  See
ante, at ---.
    Second, if the boundaries of the electoral district -- and perhaps of
its neighboring district as well -- were shaped in "an uncouth
twenty-eight-sided figure" such as that found in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U. S. 339, 340 (1960), and if the effect of the configuration were to
produce an unnatural distribution of the voting power of different racial
groups, an inquiry into the totality of circumstances would at least
arguably be required to determine whether or not the results test was
violated.  Placing elections for single-member offices entirely beyond the
scope of coverage of MDRV 2 would preclude such an inquiry, even if the
State's interest in maintaining the "uncouth" electoral system was trivial
or illusory and even if any resulting impairment of a minority group's
voting strength could be remedied without significantly impairing the
State's interest in electing judges on a district-wide basis.
    Because the results test in MDRV 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to
claims of vote dilution in judicial elections, see Chisom, ante, at ---,
and because the concerns expressed by Judge Higginbotham in distinguishing
elections of Texas district court judges from elections of supreme court
justices relate to the question whether a vote dilution violation may be
found or remedied rather than whether such a challenge may be brought, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.


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1
    The counties at issue are: Harris, Dallas, Tarrant, Bexar, Travis,
Jefferson, Lubbock, Crosby, Ector, and Midland.